QUINE AND SELLARS
on Thought and Language
Philosophy 77100, CUNY Graduate Center
Spring 2021, Thursday 2-4, on Zoom
David Rosenthal
Course requirements: One term paper due at the end of the semester on a date
to be determined, a one-page (250-word) abstract of which is due April 22.
Email sent to my Graduate Center email address will not reach me; please use
davidrosenthal1 (at) gmail (dot) com
Many readings are simply sections, not whole articles or chapters; so there's less
than it may look at first glance. We may occasionally adjust readings, adding or
deleting or shifting a selection from one topic to another or between required and
optional; an up-to-date list with revision date at the bottom will always be at
https://tinyurl.com/QS2021
Most readings will be provided. Some readings listed below, mostly optional, are
just listed with information sufficient to retrieve them, either with an independent
URL or from the Graduate Center's online library holdings.
None of the many readings listed as optional is needed for the course; they can
be ignored. Indeed, best to concentrate on the others. The optional readings
are in case you want to follow up on something or to know for future reference
what's out there that may be useful.
Other things of possible interest:
Quintessence, ed. Gibson, is a good collection of basic readings by Quine, often
useful because of the inclusion of some apparent second thoughts Quine had on
various issues. Confessions of a Confirmed Extensionalist and Other Essays, ed.
Føllesdal and Douglas B. Quine, also reprints many useful pieces. Everything
we'll read in those collections is available elsewhere. Quine in Dialogue, ed.
Føllesdal and Douglas Quine, contains interesting interviews, correspondence,
reviews, replies, and popular pieces. All three are Harvard University Press; a
useful review of the latter two is at http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=15889
"Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" has been reprinted twice in standalone
book form, once with extended section-by-section critical discussion by deVries
and Triplett (Hackett, using the '63 SPR version), and once with an introduction
by Rorty and a study guide by Brandom (Harvard) that reflects Brandom's take
on Sellars ('56 University of Minnesota Press version, without fns. added in '63).
There are a couple of useful websites devoted to Quine and one to Sellars:
http://www.wvquine.org/
http://www.lib.uci.edu/about/publications/wellek/philosophy/quine/
http://www.ditext.com/sellars/
And there is a Guide to the papers of Sellars at the University of Pittsburgh:
http://tinyurl.com/Sellars-papers
And for fun a few YouTube appearances (there are a number of others):
Quine (1978): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1iZvycU3I9w
In Conversation with Quine—The Dreben Panel
In Conversation with Quine—The Boolos Panel
Sellars (1963): http://www.youtube.com/view_play_list?p=024B36D7B43AE8B8
Sellars on meaning and language:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qN0vh_ewtPA&list=PL024B36D7B43AE8B8
Abbreviations used below:
'Q' indicates works by Quine, 'S' works by Sellars.
Quine: FLPV for From a Logical Point of View; WO for Word and Object; WP for
The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays; OR for Ontological Relativity and Other
Essays; TT for Theories and Things; PT for Pursuit of Truth; ML for Methods of
Logic; PL for Philosophical Logic, 2nd edn.; SS for From Stimulus to Science;
WsOs for Words and Objections, ed. Davidson and Hintikka (= Synthese 19,
1-2); Hahn for The Philosophy of W. V. Quine
Sellars: SPR for Science, Perception and Reality; EPM for "Empiricism and the
Philosophy of Mind"; SM for Science and Metaphysics; PP for Philosophical
Perspectives: Metaphysics and Epistemology; SR for In the Space of Reasons.
Others: CM for Rosenthal, Consciousness and Mind; JP for The Journal of
Philosophy; DR for Rosenthal.
TOPICS
1. Introductory
2. Problems about Meaning
3. Regimentation, Quantification, and Reference
4. Meaning the Same, Meaning Holism, and Abstract Meanings
5. Referential Opacity and Creatures of Darkness
6. Indeterminacy, Inscrutability, and Analytical Hypotheses
7. Attributions of Intentional States (I): Logical Form
8. Brentano's Thesis and Naturalizing the Intentional
9. Methodological Behaviorism and Theory of Mind
10. Attributions of Intentional States (II): Folk Theory, Interpretative Dramatic
Idiom, and Normative Rationality
12. Intentional States and Abstract Objects
13. Priority of Thought and Talk
14. Ascription of Mental States, Mental-State Consciousness, and Psychological
Ascent
READINGS BY WEEK
1. For 2/4: Introductory
No readings. Just peruse this course page.
2. For 2/11: Problems about Meaning
Q: "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (FLPV)
(For differences between that and the original [1951] see
http://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html)
Q: "Notes on the Theory of Reference" (FLPV)
Grice and Strawson, "In Defense of a Dogma"
Q: "Deviant Logics" (PL)
Q: "Two Dogmas in Retrospect"
Optional:
Harman, "Quine on Meaning and Existence, I"
Q: "On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma" (TT)
Q: "Flight from Intension," §§40, 42, 43 (WO)
Carnap, reply to Quine
Fodor, "Water's Water Everywhere,"
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n20/jerry-fodor/waters-water-everywhere
Q: "Use and its Place in Meaning" (TT)
S: "Is There a Synthetic A Priori?" (SPR)
S: "Some Reflections on Language Games" (SPR, SR)
Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," Proceedings and
Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47
Harman, review of Philosophical Logic, Metaphilosophy April 1971 (available
on Wiley Online Library despite stated year limit)
Rorty, "Criteria and Necessity," Noûs November 1973
Lepore and Fodor, "Précis of Holism: A Shopper's Guide," Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, September 1993
DR: "Translation and Understanding," PowerPoint presentation, §§1, 2,
and 4, https://www.davidrosenthal.org/DR-translation-lecture.pdf
3. For 2/18: Regimentation, Quantification, and Reference
(Looks like a lot, but many are very short)
Q: "On What There Is" (FLPV)
Q: "Logic as a Source of Syntactic Insights" (WP)
Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology,"
http://www.ditext.com/carnap/carnap.html
Geach, "Quine's Syntactical Insights" (WsOs)
Q: "Replies: to Geach" (WsOs, under "Replies")
(Quine's WsOs replies are often very useful)
Q: "Regimentation" and "Semantic Ascent" (WO, §§33-39, 56)
Marcus, "Interpreting Quantification"
Q: "Existence and Quantification" (OR)
S: "Grammar and Existence: A Preface to Ontology" (SPR, SR)
Optional:
Q: Methods of Logic, revised edn. (1959), §§ 16 and 33-37
Harman, "Quine on Meaning and Existence, II"
Q: "On Carnap's Views on Ontology" (WP)
Q: "Ontology and Ideology Revisited," JP, September 1983, 499-502
"Discussion of the Paper by Ruth B. Marcus" (interesting; historically important)
Q: "Reply to Professor Marcus" (WP)
Q: "Deviant Logics," § on substitutional quantification, PL
Q: "Posits and Reality" (WP)
Scheffler and Chomsky, "What Is Said to Be," Proceedings of the Aristototelian
Society 1958-59
Marcus, "Quantification and Ontology," Noûs September 1972
Q: "Confessions of a Confirmed Extensionalist"
Føllesdal, "Mind and Meaning"
Fara, "Socratizing"
Kripke, "Is There A Problem about Substitutional Quantification?"
4. For 2/25: Meaning the Same, Meaning Holism, and Abstract Meanings
Q: "The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics" (FLPV)
S: "Notes on Intentionality," PP
S: "Some Reflections on Language Games" (SPR, SR)
S: EPM, §§30-31, 34-44
Harman, "Three Levels of Meaning"
Optional:
Dennett, "Comment on Wilfrid Sellars," Synthese July-August 1974
S: "Reply," Synthese July-August 1974
Greenberg and Harman, "Conceptual Role Semantics"
S: "Meaning as Functional Classification" (SR)
S: "Language as Thought and as Communication"
S: "Naming and Saying" (SPR, SR)
Harman, review of Science and Metaphysics
Q: "Use and Its Place in Meaning"
Geach, Mental Acts, §18
Grice, "Logic and Conversation"
Harman, review of Sellars, Philosophical Perspectives
DR: "Translation and Understanding," PowerPoint presentation, §§1, 2,
and 4, https://www.davidrosenthal.org/DR-translation-lecture.pdf
5. For 3/4: Referential Opacity and Creatures of Darkness
Q: "Reference and Modality" (FLPV)
Q: "Vagaries of Reference" (WO, ch. 4)
Q: "Intensions Revisited"
Smullyan, "Modality and Description"
Q: review of Identity and Individuation, ed. Munitz, just pp. 492-3 (on
Kripke's "Identity and Necessity")
Optional:
Geach, "Intentional Identity"
Q: "Modality" (WO §41)
Føllesdal, "Quine on Modality"
Føllesdal, "Preface to the New Edition" (WO)
Church, "A Remark Concering Quine's Paradox about Modality"
Smullyan, review of Quine, "The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic,"
The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 12 (1947): 139-141
Q: "Replies: to Føllesdal" (WsOs)
Kripke, "Unrestricted Exportation and Some Morals for the Philosophy
of Language"
Goodman, "The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals"
Q: "Three Grades of Modal Involvement," WP
Kaplan, "Quantifying In" (WsOs)
Q: "Replies: to Kaplan" (WsOs)
Q: "Reply to Professor Marcus" (WP)
Burgess, "Marcus, Kripke, and Names"
Føllesdal, "Essentialism and Reference" (Hahn)
Q: "Reply to Dagfinn Føllesdal" (Hahn)
Kripke, "Quantified Modality and Essentialism"
Kripke, "Quantified Modal Logic and Quine’s Critique: Some Further Observations"
6. For 3/11: Indeterminacy, Inscrutability, and Analytical Hypotheses
Q: "Speaking of Objects" (OR)
Q: "Translation and Meaning" (WO, ch. 2)
Harman, "An Introduction to Translation and Meaning"
Q: "Ontological Relativity" (OR)
Q: "On the Reasons for the Indeterminacy of Translation"
Optional:
Q: "Progress on Two Fronts," JP April 1996
Q: "Indeterminacy of Translation Again," JP January 1987
Q: "Where Do We Disagree?" Hahn
Q: "Three Indeterminacies"
Føllesdal, "Preface to the New Edition" (WO)
Q: "Carnap and Logical Truth" (WP)
Q: "The Behavioral Limits of Meaning"
Q: "On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World"
Neale, "Meaning, Grammar, and Indeterminacy"
Dreben, "Quine on Quine" (good selection of Quine passages on this topic)
Harman, "Quine's Semantic Relativity"
Fodor, The Elm and the Expert, ch. 3
Wilcock, "Two Failures to Scrutinize Reference"
Q: "Assuming Objects"
Q and Davidson, "Exchange between Donald Davidson and W. V. Quine"
7. For 3/18: Attributions of Intentional States (I): Logical Form
Q: "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes" (WP)
Davidson, "On Saying That" (WsOs)
Q: "Replies: to Davidson" (WsOs)
S: "Some Problems about Belief" (WsOs),
Q: "Replies: to Sellars" (WsOs),
Kaplan, "Quantifying In" (WsOs)
Q: "Replies: to Kaplan" (WsOs)
Optional:
Burdick, "A Logical Form for the Propositional Attitudes"
Q: "Burdick's Attitudes" (with the Burdick article)
S: "Mental Events"
S: "Reply to Quine"
Føllesdal, "Preface to the New Edition" (WO)
Kripke, "Unrestricted Exportation and Some Morals for the Philosophy of
Language" (optional for week 5)
Kaplan, "Opacity" (Hahn)
Q: "Reply to David Kaplan" (Hahn)
Davidson, "Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages"
8. For 3/25: Brentano's Thesis and Naturalizing the Intentional
Chisholm, "Sentences about Believing"
Q: "Other Objects for the Attitudes," (WO, §44)
Q: "The Double Standard" (WO, §45)
Q: "Intension" (PT)
Lewis, "Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications"
Optional:
DR: "Talking about Thinking,"
https://www.davidrosenthal.org/DR-Talking-about-Thinking.pdf
Chisholm, The First Person, chs. 3-4, in The Nature of Mind, ed. DR
DR: "Intentionality,"
https://www.davidrosenthal.org/DR-Intentionality.pdf and CM
Brentano, selections from Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint
Fodor, "A Theory of Content, I: The Problem"
DR: "Awareness and Identification of Self," §2,
https://www.davidrosenthal.org/DR-Awn-Idfn-of-Self.pdf
Searle, "The Nature of Intentional States"
Føllesdal, "Developments in Quine's Behaviorism"
No class April 1—Spring Break
9. For 4/8: Methodological Behaviorism and Theory of Mind
S: EPM (all) (SPR) (also in the Rorty-Brandom book and in
deVries and Triplett, Knowledge, Mind, and the Given, and
http://selfpace.uconn.edu/class/percep/SellarsEmpPhilMind.pdf
S: "The Structure of Knowledge," Lecture II: Minds
Review Lewis, "Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications" (week 8)
DR, "Thought, Speech, and Consciousness,"
https://www.davidrosenthal.org/DR-Kent-Sellars.pdf
Optional:
S: "Sensibility and Understanding" (SM)
S: "Appearances and Things in Themselves: 2. Persons," (SM)
S: "Behaviorism, Language and Meaning"
DeVries, "Wilfrid Sellars" (August 2011), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sellars/
Rosenberg, "Wilfrid Sellars" (rev. 2009), previous Stanford Encyclopedia entry,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/sellars/
N.B. Both Stanford Encyclopedia entries are well worth reading.
McDowell, "Sellars's Thomism"
McDowell, "Why Is Sellars's Essay Called 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind?'"
Crane, "Fraught with Ought" (SR)
S: "Aristotelian Philosophies of Mind"
DR: "Why Are Verbally Expressed Thoughts Conscious?", esp. §5,
https://www.davidrosenthal.org/DR-Why.pdf
Rosenberg, "Ryleans and Outlookers: Wilfrid Sellars on 'Mental States'"
Rosenberg, "Fusing the Images: Nachruf for Wilfrid Sellars"
O'Shea, "On the Structure of Sellars’s Naturalism with a Normative Turn"
10. For 4/15: Attributions of Intentional States (II): Folk Theory,
Interpretative Dramatic Idiom, and Normative Rationality
Q: "Flight from Intension," esp. §45 (WO, ch. 6)
Q: "Things of the Mind" (SS)
S: "The Conceptual and the Real: Intentionality" (SM)
( = "Some Reflections on Thoughts and Things," Noûs 1; also SR)
S: "Language as Thought and as Communication," in optional for week 4
Optional:
Schiller, "Psychological Nominalism and the Plausibility of Sellars's Myth
of Jones"
DR: "Content, Interpretation, and Consciousness" (CM)
O'Shea, "The ‘Theory Theory’ of Mind and the Aims of Sellars’ Original Myth
of Jones"
Triplett and deVries, "Is Sellars's Rylean Hypothesis Plausible? A Dialogue"
Davidson, "Thought and Talk"
Dennett, "True Believers" and postscript
O'Shea, "Normativity and Scientific Naturalism in Sellars' 'Janus-Faced'
Space of Reasons"
deVries, "Folk Psychology, Theories, and the Sellarsian Roots"
11. For 4/22: Accommodate overflow from previous topics
Abstracts are due this day
No new readings; catch up—and do abstracts!
12. For 4/29: Intentional States and Abstract Objects
S: "Notes on Intentionality," JP, 61: 655-65 (also PP)
Q: "Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis" (FLPV)
Q: "Ontic Decision" (WO ch. 7)
S: "Abstract Entities," PP (also SR)
Optional:
Harman, review of Sellars, Philosophical Perspectives, in
optional for week 4
Goodman: "Nominalisms" (Hahn)
Q: "Reply to Nelson Goodman" (Hahn)
S: "The Conceptual and the Real: Truth" (SM)
S: "Towards a Theory of Predication"
S: "On the Introduction of Abstract Entities,"
S: "Language as Thought and as Communication" §§ix-x,
in optional for week 4
13. For 5/6: Priority of Thought and Talk
Chisholm and S: "Intentionality and the Mental"
Q: "Mind and Verbal Dispositions"
Q: "Propositional Objects" (OR)
S: EPM, §§39-59
DR: "Intentionality," §§1-6, plus postscript,
https://www.davidrosenthal.org/DR-Intentionality.pdf (also in CM)
Optional:
DR: "The Chisholm-Sellars Correspondence,"
http://www.ditext.com/rosenthal/rosent-4.html
DR and S: "Rosenthal-Sellars Correspondence on Intentionality,"
https://www.davidrosenthal.org/DR-Sellars-corresp.pdf (also
http://www.ditext.com/sellars/rsc.htm)
Grice, "Logic and Conversation" (in optional for week 4)
DR: "The Mind and Its Expression,"
https://www.davidrosenthal.org/DR-Mind-and-Its-Exprn.pdf
Rosenberg, "Speaking Lions"
Bermúdez, "Two Arguments for the Language-Independence of Thought"
Searle, "The Nature of Intentional States" (in optional for week 8)
14. For 5/13: Ascription of Mental States, Consciousness, and
Psychological Ascent
S: EPM, §59
Q: "Other Objects for the Attitudes" (WO, §44)
Q: "Semantic Ascent" (WO, §56)
DR: "Thinking that One Thinks,"
https://www.davidrosenthal.org/DR-TTT.pdf (also CM)
DR: "Intentionality," just §7,
https://www.davidrosenthal.org/DR-Intentionality.pdf (also CM)
Q: "Ontological Relativity," only part II (OR)
DR: "Why Are Verbally Expressed Thoughts Conscious?", §5,
https://www.davidrosenthal.org/DR-Why.pdf (also CM)
Optional:
DR: "Introspection and Self-Interpretation,"
https://www.davidrosenthal.org/DR-Intrn-Self-Intpn.pdf (also CM)
DR: "Why Verbally Expressed Thoughts Are Conscious," §§1-4,
https://www.davidrosenthal.org/DR-Why.pdf (also CM)
DR: "Consciousness and Its Function," esp. §§5-6,
https://www.davidrosenthal.org/DR-func.pdf
DR: "Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation and Function," esp. §5
https://www.davidrosenthal.org/DR-Mcogn-Mrepn.pdf
rev. 9/30/20